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This mini-review illustrates that testing the traditional null hypothesis is not always the appropriate 
strategy. Half in jest, we discuss Aristotle’s scientific investigations into the shape of the earth 
in the context of evaluating the traditional null hypothesis. We conclude that Aristotle was 
actually interested in evaluating informative hypotheses. In contemporary science the situation 
is not much different. That is, many researchers have no particular interest in the traditional null 
hypothesis. More can be learned from data by evaluating specific expectations, or so-called 
informative hypotheses, than by testing the traditional null hypothesis. These informative 
hypotheses will be introduced while providing an overview of the literature on evaluating 
informative hypothesis.
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What is “Wrong” With the traditional null 
hypothesis?
Cohen (1994) aptly summarized the criticism of traditional null 
hypothesis testing in the title of his paper “The earth is round 
(p < 0.05).” Let us elaborate on his criticism using an example 
inspired by this title originally meant to instruct and entertain.
The question of the shape of the earth was a recurring issue in 
scientific debate during the era of Aristotle (384–322 BC; see Rusell, 
1997). By that time, the Greek idea that the earth was round domi-
nated scientific thinking. The only serious opponents were the atom-
ists Leucippus and Democritus, who still believed that the earth was 
a flat disk floating in the ocean, as certain ancient Mesopotamian 
philosophers had maintained. Now let us embark on some historical 
science fiction to tell the story of how Aristotle in his scientific inves-
tigations might have used different ways of evaluating hypotheses1.
We propose that in order to falsify the old Mesopotamian 
hypothesis, Aristotle might have used an approach based on test-
ing the traditional null hypothesis:
H
0
: The shape of the earth is a flat disk,
H
1
: The shape of the earth is not a flat disk.
Clearly, these hypotheses are no statistical hypotheses and no actual 
statistical inference could have been carried out; these hypotheses 
are purely designed to serve as an example.
So, in the set up of our reverse science fiction, Aristotle would 
have gathered data about the shape of the earth and found evidence 
against the null hypothesis, for example: stars that were seen in 
introduction
The present mini-review argues that testing the traditional null 
hypothesis is not always the appropriate strategy. That is, many 
researchers have no particular interest in the hypothesis “nothing 
is going on” (Cohen, 1990). So why test a hypothesis one is not 
really interested in? The APA stresses in its publication manual 
that null hypothesis testing should be a starting point for statisti-
cal analyses: “Reporting elements such as effect sizes and confi-
dence intervals are needed to convey the most complete meaning 
of the results” (American Psychological Association, 2001, p. 33; 
see also Fidler, 2002). In the current paper we go beyond this 
first step of reporting effect sizes and confidence intervals, argu-
ing that specific expectations should be evaluated directly. As 
Osborne (2010) stated: “The world doesn’t need another journal 
promulgating 20th century thinking, genuflecting at the altar 
of p < 0.05. I challenge us to challenge tradition” (p. 3). This 
is exactly what we set out to do in the current paper. Statistical 
tools for the evaluation of informative hypotheses are becoming 
available and are more often used in applications. We provide 
an overview of the current state of affairs for the evaluation of 
informative hypotheses. But first we argue, half in jest, what is 
“wrong” with the traditional null hypothesis and introduce the 
informative hypothesis.
One important prior note has to be made. Researchers like 
Wagenmakers et al. (2008) criticize T-tests for rendering no legiti-
mate results and argue that p-values are prone to misinterpretation. 
Others, such as Coulson et al. (2010), or Fidler and Thompson 
(2001), explicitly argue against solely reporting p-values and argue 
for using confidence intervals. Along similar lines, using focused 
contrasts which could be used to evaluate expectations directly is 
proposed by Rosenthal et al. (2000). However, in the current paper 
we will focus on developments in statistics that move beyond using 
confidence intervals, effect sizes, and planned contrasts.
1The historical figure Aristotle never denied that the earth was round; in fact, from 
the third century BC onward, no educated person in the history of Western civiliza-
tion believed that the earth was flat. Indeed, Erasthenes (276–195 BC) gave a reaso-
nable approximation of the earth’s circumference and provided strong support for 
the hypothesis that the earth is round.
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In such a direct comparison the conclusion will be more 
informative.
What does this historical example teach us?
Evaluating specific expectations directly produces more useful 
results than sequentially testing traditional null hypotheses against 
catch-all rivals. We argue that researchers are often interested in 
the evaluation of informative hypotheses and already know that 
the traditional null hypothesis is an unrealistic hypothesis. This 
presupposes that prior knowledge often is available; if this is not 
the case, testing the traditional null hypothesis is appropriate. In 
most applied articles, however, prior knowledge is indeed avail-
able in the form of specific expectations about the ordering of 
 statistical parameters.
Let us illustrate this using an example of Van de Schoot et al. 
(2010). The authors investigated the association between popular-
ity and antisocial behavior in a large sample of young adolescents 
from preparatory vocational schools (VMBO) in the Netherlands. 
In this setting, young adolescents are at increased risk of becoming 
(more) antisocial. Five so-called sociometric status groups were 
defined in terms of a combination of social preference and social 
impact: a popular, rejected, neglected, controversial, and an average 
group of adolescents. Each sociometric status group was character-
ized by distinct behavioral patterns which influenced the quality 
of social relations. For example, peer rejection was found to be 
related to antisocial behavior, whereas popular adolescents tended 
to be  considered as well-known, attractive, athletic, and socially 
competent, although this group could also be antisocial, as was 
shown by Van de Schoot et al. (2010).
Suppose we want to compare these five sociometric status 
groups on the number of committed offenses reported to the 
police last year (minor theft, violence, and so on) and let the 
groups be denoted by μ1 for the mean on the number of com-
mitted offenses for the popular group, μ2 for the rejected group, 
μ3 for the neglected group, μ4 for the controversial group and 
μ5 for the average group. Different types of hypotheses can be 
formulated that are used in the procedures and are described in 
the remainder of this paper.
First, informative hypotheses can be formulated denoted by
H H HI I IN1 2, , ,…  for a set of N hypotheses. These hypotheses 
contain information about the ordering of the parameters in a 
model, in our example the five means. Such expectations about 
the ordering of parameters can stem from previous studies, a 
literature review or even academic debate. Consider an imagi-
nary hypothesis with inequalities between the five mean scores,
HI1 3 1 5 2 4: < < < <µ µ µ µ µ , where the neglected group is expected 
to commit fewer offenses compared to the popular group, who 
in turn are expected to commit fewer offenses compared to the 
average group, and so on. If no information is available about the 
ordering, this is denoted by a comma. Another expectation could 
be the hypothesis HI2 3 1 5 2 4: < { , , }<µ µ µ µ µ , where the neglected 
group is expected to commit fewer offenses compared to the popu-
lar, average, and rejected groups. There is no expected ordering 
between these three groups, but all three are expected to commit 
fewer offenses than the controversial group. The research question 
would be which of the two informative hypotheses receives most 
support from the data.
Egypt were not seen in countries north of Egypt, while stars that 
never were beyond the range of observation in northern Europe 
were seen to rise and set in Egypt. Such observations could not 
be taken as evidence of a flat earth. H
0
 would have been rejected, 
leading Aristotle to conclude that the earth cannot be represented 
by a flat disk.
In actual fact, Aristotle agreed with Pythagoras (582 to ca. 507 
BC), who believed that all astronomical objects have a spherical 
shape, including the earth. So, once again embarking on an episode 
of imaginary history, Aristotle might also have tested:
H0′ : The shape of the earth is a sphere,
H1′: The shape of the earth is not a sphere.
Now, imagine that Aristotle continued his search for data and that 
he gathered data yielding evidence against (!) the null hypothesis2: 
while standing on a mountain top, he noticed that the Earth’s 
surface has many irregularities and concluded that if enough 
irregularities could be observed, this might provide just enough 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis. And so it might have hap-
pened that Aristotle once again rejected the null hypothesis, con-
cluding that the earth is not a sphere [Cohen: “The earth is round 
(p < 0.05)”].
What can be learned from this conclusion? Not much! Both 
hypothesis tests reject the traditional null hypotheses H
0
 and 
H0′ . As a next step, following the Neyman–Pearson procedure 
of hypothesis testing, we could tentatively adopt the alternative 
hypotheses H
1
 and H1′. This procedure tells us that the earth is 
neither a flat disk nor a sphere and consequently we remain 
ignorant of the earth’s actual shape. This ignorance is a result 
of the “catch-all” alternative hypothesis as proposed by Neyman 
and Pearson (1967). Unfortunately, the catch-all includes all 
shapes that are non-flat and non-spherical, for example pear-
shaped3.
Rather than using the hypothesis tests given above, we might 
argue that Aristotle was actually interested in evaluating:
H
A
: The shape of the earth is a flat disk,
versus
H
B
: The shape of the earth is a sphere.
2At the time, no one was able to see the earth as a whole and know it to be a sphe-
re by direct observation. But it was possible to derive some conclusions from the 
hypothesis that the earth is a sphere and use these to test the null hypothesis. For 
example, one could predict that if someone sailed west for a sufficient amount of 
time, this person would return to the original starting point (Magellan did this). 
Or one could predict that if the earth was a sphere, ships at sea would first show 
their sails above the horizon, and then later, as they sailed closer, their hulls (Galileo 
observed this). These precise predictions, if exactly confirmed, would establish a 
provisional objective reality for the idea that the earth is a sphere.
3Admittedly, not all methodologists would agree on this point. In response to Ari-
stotle’s imagined disappointment, Popper would have argued that this insight is all 
that Aristotelian science, or any science for that matter, can hope for. When it comes 
to general hypotheses, or hypotheses that are beyond the reach of direct verifica-
tion, we can only be sure of their falsification. Direct positive evidence for hypothe-
ses about the shape of the earth cannot be obtained, so there would be no reason 
for Aristotle to be disappointed. Popper would have argued that as there is no way 
to prove that the earth is spherical from direct verification, we can only hypothesize 
that it has the shape of a sphere. Since Aristotle found evidence demonstrating that 
the earth is not spherical, this hypothesis is rejected. In fact, according to Popperian 
reasoning, Aristotle should rejoice in the fact that at least he now knows the earth 
is not a sphere!
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combination with inequality constraints imposed on regression 
coefficients. The methodology consists of several steps to be per-
formed with the aid of commonly used software, Mplus (Muthén 
and Muthén, 2007)6. Van de Schoot and Strohmeier (in press) intro-
duce the methodology to non-statisticians and show that using 
this method results in a power gain. That is, fewer participants are 
needed to obtain a significant effect compared to a default chi-
square test.
 model selection approach
A second way of evaluating an informative hypothesis is to use a 
model selection approach. This is not a test of the model in the 
sense of hypothesis testing, rather it is an evaluation between 
statistical models using a trade-off between model fit and model 
complexity. Several competing statistical models may be ranked 
according to their value on the model selection tool used and 
the one with the best trade-off is the winner of the model 
selection competition.
There is a variety of model selection procedures commonly 
used in practical applications, most notably Akaike’s informa-
tion criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973), the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978), and the deviance information 
criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). Problems with these 
standard model selection tools in the context of evaluating 
informative hypotheses arise because the tools are not equipped 
to deal with inequality constraints (Mulder et al., 2009a; Van 
de Schoot et al., under review-b). Although the model selection 
tools differ in their expression, the result always consists of two 
parts: the likelihood of the best fitting hypothesis within the 
model is a measure of model fit; and an expression containing 
the number of (effective) parameters of the model is a meas-
ure of complexity. The greater the number of dimensions, the 
greater the compensation for model complexity becomes. So, 
adding a parameter should be accompanied by an increase in 
model fit to accommodate for the increase in complexity. The 
problem is that the expression of complexity is based on the 
number of parameters in the model and cannot take inequal-
ity constraints into account. That is, HI1 3 1 5 2 4: < < < <µ µ µ µ µ  
and HI2 3 1 5 2 4: < { , , }<µ µ µ µ µ  would receive the same measure 
for complexity, which is unwanted, because HI1is more par-
simonious thanHI2 ,
 due to more restriction imposed on the 
five means.
Alternative model selection tools have been proposed in the 
literature. First, an alternative model selection procedure is the 
paired-comparison information criterion (PCIC) proposed by 
Dayton (1998, 2003), with an application in Taylor et al. (2007). 
The PCIC is an exploratory approach which computes a default 
model selection tool for all logically possible subsets of group 
orderings. Only the source code for the programming language 
GAUSS was available for the PCIC (Dayton, 2001), but Kuiper 
and Hoijtink (2010) made the PCIC available in a user friendly 
interface7. The disadvantage of the PCIC is that it is an explora-
tory approach.
Second, there is the traditional null hypothesis (denoted by H
0
), 
which states that nothing is going on and all groups have the same 
score, H
0
: μ
1
 = μ
2
 = μ
3
 = μ
4
 = μ
5
. Third, if no constraints are imposed 
on any of the means and any ordering is equally likely, the hypothesis 
is called a “catch-all” alternative hypothesis, or an unconstrained 
hypothesis (denoted by H
U
): H
U
: μ
1
, μ
2
, μ
3
, μ
4
, μ
5
. In the next section 
we present an overview of possible alternatives for traditional null 
hypothesis testing to evaluate one or more informative hypotheses.
evaluating informative hypotheses
Different procedures are described in a range of sources that 
allow for the evaluation of informative hypotheses. We present 
an overview of technical papers, software, and applications for 
two types of approaches: (1) hypothesis testing approaches 
and (2) model selection approaches. Note that we limit our-
selves to a discussion of papers where software is available for 
applied researchers.
 hypothesis testing approach
Some approaches reported in the literature render a p-value for 
the comparison of H
I
 with H
0
 or with H
U
. First, an adaptation of 
the traditional F-test for analysis of variance (ANOVA) was pro-
posed by Silvapulle et al. (2002, see also Silvapulle and Sen, 2004), 
called the F-bar test. It is a confirmatory method to test one single 
informative hypothesis in two steps, for example:
H0 3 1 5 2 4: = = = =µ µ µ µ µ
versus
HI1 3 1 5 2 4: < < < <  ,µ µ µ µ µ
and
HI1 3 1 5 2 4: < < < <µ µ µ µ µ
versus
HU : , , , ,  ,3 1 5 2 4µ µ µ µ µ
where in the second hypothesis test HI1 serves as the null hypoth-
esis. Software for the F-bar test is described in Kuiper et al. (2010), 
but applications have not yet, to our knowledge, been reported 
in the literature. Application of the F-bar test is easy using the 
software4 and the results are comparable with a classical F-test. 
The disadvantage is that only one single informative hypothesis at 
a time can be evaluated and this only for univariate ANOVA.
Testing informative hypotheses for structural equation models 
(SEM) is described in Stoel et al. (2006), where constraints are 
imposed on variance terms to obtain only positive values (see also 
Gonzalez and Griffin, 2001). A likelihood ratio test is used and the 
software is available in the statistical package R (R Development 
Core Team, 2005)5.
The procedure described in Van de Schoot et al. (2010) also 
makes use of a likelihood ratio test, but goes one step further than 
Stoel et al. (2006). A parametric bootstrap procedure is used in 
4The software can be downloaded at http://vkc.library.uu.nl/vkc/ms/research/
ProjectsWiki/Informative%20hypotheses.aspx
5The corresponding scripts can be downloaded from the Web site of Psychological 
Methods.
6The software can be downloaded at staff.fss.uu.nl/agjvandeschoot
7The software can be downloaded at http://vkc.library.uu.nl/vkc/ms/research/
ProjectsWiki/Informative%20hypotheses.aspx
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Second, the literature also contains one modification of the AIC 
that can be used in the context of inequality constrained ANOVA 
models. It is called the order-restricted information criterion 
(ORIC; Anraku, 1999; Kuiper et al., in press) with an applica-
tion in Hothorn et al. (2009). It can be used for the evaluation of 
models differing in the order restrictions among a set of means. 
Inequality constraints are taken into account in the estimation 
of the likelihood and in the penalty term of the ORIC. Software 
for ORIC is described in Kuiper et al. (2010). The ORIC is as yet 
only available for ANOVA models, but a generalization is under 
construction.
Alternatives for the BIC and the DIC are under construction: 
see Romeijn et al. (under review) and Van de Schoot et al. (under 
review-a), respectively.
Finally, one other method of model selection, which is receiving 
more and more attention in the literature, involves the evaluation 
of informative hypothesis using Bayes factors. In this method each 
(informative) hypothesis of interest is provided with a “degree of 
support” which tells us exactly how much support there is for each 
of the hypotheses under investigation. This process involves col-
lecting evidence that is meant to provide support for or against a 
given hypothesis; as evidence accumulates, the degree of support 
for a hypothesis increases or decreases.
The methodology of evaluating a set of inequality constrained 
hypotheses has proven to be a flexible tool that can deal with 
many types of constraints. We refer to the book of Hoijtink et al. 
(2008b), and the papers of Van de Schoot et al. (in press) and 
Van de Schoot et al. (2011) as a first step for interested readers. 
For a philosophical background, see Romeijn and Van de Schoot 
(2008) and for more information on hypothesis elicitation, see Van 
Wesel et al. (under review). Various papers describe comparisons 
between traditional null hypothesis testing and Bayesian evalua-
tion of informative hypotheses; see Kuiper and Hoijtink (2010), 
Hoijtink et al. (2008b), Hoijtink and Klugkist (2007), and Van de 
Schoot et al. (2011).
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conclusion
Statistics have come a long way since the early beginnings of 
testing the traditional null hypothesis of “nothing is going on.” 
Developments in statistics, in particular specific developments 
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directly evaluate their expectations specified with inequality con-
straints. This mini-review illustrates that testing the traditional null 
hypothesis is not always an appropriate strategy. We argued that 
more can be learned from data by evaluating informative hypoth-
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we presented the current state of affairs in the area of evaluating 
informative hypotheses.
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